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Abstract: Despite the lack of specific provisions in the European Convention on Human Rights regarding gender-
based violence, the European Court of Human Rights has developed a substantial body of case-law in this area. It 
has been done through the interpretation and application of a number of provisions in the European Convention 
on Human Rights that are relevant to gender-based violence. This paper provides a review of the approach of the 
European Court of Human Rights in cases concerning gender-based violence. Namely, it is evident that a 
remarkable spate of cases dealing with gender-based violence is considered by the European Court of Human 
Rights, which provides very solid protection in this field. However, it seems that certain aspects of the case-law on 
gender-based violence are somewhat inconsistent. In this sense, having in mind that the judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights are the main guidelines for the States in fulfilling their obligations arising from 
the Convention, it is very important for the Court to fully clarify its approach in this regard. 
 
Keywords: Gender-Based Violence; Violence against Women; European Convention on Human Rights; European 
Court of Human Rights; Istanbul Convention 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The European Convention on Human Rights („ECHR‟ or „the Convention‟) is Europe‟s 
core human rights treaty, which guarantees the rights and freedoms it includes to everyone 
within the jurisdiction of the Member States of the Council of Europe. Based on the ECHR, 
the European Court of Human Rights („ECtHR or „the Court‟) has issued a significant number 
of judgments and decisions as regards cases concerning gender-based violence („GBV‟), 
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs | Vol. 6, No. 2, 2020 | eISSN 1857-9760 
Published online by the Institute for Research and European Studies at www.e-jlia.com      
     
 
                                             
 72 
despite the fact that the Convention does not include any specific provisions in that regard. 
However, there are a number of provisions in the Convention that have been identified as 
relevant to GBV, and were used by the ECtHR to develop an extensive case-law in this 
sphere. Those provisions are Article 2 (right to life), Article 3 (prohibition of torture), Article 4 
(prohibition of slavery and forced labor), Article 6 (right to a fair trial), Article 8 (right to 
respect for private and family law), Article 13 (right to an effective remedy), Article 14 
(prohibition of discrimination) and Protocol 12 to the Convention (general prohibition of 
discrimination). Namely, based on the interpretation and application of these provisions, the 
ECtHR has developed standards regarding GBV and provided protection before the Court in 
this field. This paper has placed its focus on providing a review of the approach of the ECtHR 
in cases dealing with GBV. In that sense, it will first define the concept of GBV and the 
relevant international legal framework, especially having in mind that no consensus has been 
achieved yet as regards the meaning of the term „GBV‟, which is often interchangeably used 
with the term violence against women („VAW‟). The second part of the paper will encompass 
analysis of the evolution and treatment of different forms of GBV in the case-law of the 
ECtHR.  
A special focus will be placed on cases of domestic violence, and rape and sexual 
abuse, since most cases concerning GBV that are brought before the Court are related to 
these forms of GBV. The next part deals with the Istanbul Convention, as the most 
comprehensive and far-reaching international treaty to address VAW, exploring its use by the 
Court as a means for interpretation of the ECHR. Lastly, the results of the analysis as regards 
the approach of the ECtHR in cases dealing with GBV will be summarized. 
 
GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE:  
DEFINITION AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The term gender-based violence and the term violence against women are often used 
interchangeably, including in some international conventions (Duban and Radacic 2017, 44), 
as it has been widely acknowledged that most gender-based violence is inflicted on women 
and girls, by men (World Health Organization 2013; World Health Organization 2017). 
However, it seems that there are not synonymous, as GBV is increasingly used as a more 
expansive term compared to VAW (World Health Organization 2013; World Health 
Organization 2017). The CEDAW General recommendation 19 (UN Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 1992) gave the first international law 
definition of GBV in 1992, as “a form of discrimination that seriously inhibits women's ability to 
enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with men”. It further stipulates that “the 
definition of discrimination includes gender-based violence, that is, violence that is directed 
against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately” (CEDAW 
1992). 
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The widespread use of the term „GBV‟ followed after its inclusion in the UN 
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Violence against Women in 1993 (UN General 
Assembly 1993). It defined the term „VAW‟ as “any act of gender-based violence that results 
in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, 
including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring 
in public or in private life” (UN General Assembly 1993, Article 1). Accordingly, it seems that 
the term „GBV‟ was originally adopted in order to articulate the problem regarding VAW. 
However, although VAW is defined by reference to GBV, there is no definition of the term 
„gender‟. 
The first regional binding instrument on violence against women, the Inter-American 
Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women from 
1994 (Organization of American States (OAS) 1994), known as Convention of Belém do Pará, 
defines VAW as “any act or conduct, based on gender, which causes death or physical, sexual 
or psychological harm or suffering to women, whether in the public or the private sphere”. 
The term „GBV‟ is not used in this Convention. 
The second regional binding instrument on violence against women, the Protocol to 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa from 
2003 (African Union 2003), known as Maputo Protocol, uses the term „gender-based violence 
against women‟. Namely, the State Parties to the Protocol agree “to take concrete steps to 
give greater attention to the human rights of women in order to eliminate all forms of 
discrimination and of gender-based violence against women”. The term „VAW‟ is defined as 
“all acts perpetrated against women which cause or could cause them physical, sexual, 
psychological, and economic harm, including the threat to take such acts; or to undertake the 
imposition of arbitrary restrictions on or deprivation of fundamental freedoms in private or 
public life in peace time and during situations of armed conflicts or of war” (African Union 
2003, Article 1). 
The Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against 
Women and Domestic Violence from 2011 (Council of Europe 2011), known as Istanbul 
Convention, which is the third regional binding instrument, also uses the term „gender-based 
violence against women‟. Unlike the Maputo Protocol, the Istanbul Convention provides a 
definition of the term „gender-based violence against women‟, as “violence that is directed 
against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately” (Council 
of Europe 2011, Article 3). Moreover, the Istanbul Convention defines as well the term 
„gender‟, as “the socially constructed roles, behaviors, activities and attributes that a given 
that a given society considers appropriate for women and men” (Council of Europe 2011, 
Article 3). VAW is defined as “a violation of human rights and a form of discrimination against 
women and shall mean all acts of gender-based violence that result in, or are likely to result 
in, physical, sexual, psychological or economic harm or suffering to women, including threats 
of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in 
private life” (Council of Europe 2011, Article 3). 
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The use of the term „gender-based violence against women‟, as well as the definition 
of the term „gender‟, implies that GBV does not have to be directed only at women. 
Moreover, in this sense, the Preamble of the Istanbul Convention states that “women and 
girls are exposed to a higher risk of gender-based violence than men” (Council of Europe 
2011). Similarly, the Explanatory Report to the Istanbul Convention states that “the fact that 
women experience gender-based violence, including domestic violence, to a significantly 
larger extent than men can be considered an objective and reasonable justification to employ 
resources and take special measures for the benefit of women victims only” (Council of 
Europe 2011a, 10). It also states that “violence against women, including domestic violence, is 
one of the most serious forms of gender-based violations of human rights in Europe” 
(Council of Europe 2011a, 1). Thus, it seems that there is a tendency to use the term „GBV‟ in a 
broader sense, in terms of violence that is being directed at a person on the basis of gender, 
and that also encompass VAW as one of its forms. It implies that men can also be targets of 
GBV, and, consequently, that the terms „GBV‟ and „VAW‟ are not synonymous. Moreover, it is 
explicitly stated in the Preamble of the Istanbul Convention that “domestic violence affects 
women disproportionately, and that men may also be victims of domestic violence” (Council 
of Europe 2011). 
However, it should be also noted that the Explanatory Report to the Istanbul 
Convention foresees that “the use of the expression „gender-based violence against women‟ 
(…) is understood as equivalent to the expression „gender-based violence‟ used in the 
CEDAW Committee General Recommendation No. 19 on violence against women (1992), the 
United Nations General Assembly Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women 
(1993) (…)” as well as that “this expression is to be understood as aimed at protecting women 
from violence resulting from gender stereotypes, and specifically encompasses 
women”(Council of Europe 2011a, 8). 
On the other hand, various UN entities use the term „GBV‟ in its broad sense. 
According to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, GBV is “any harmful act directed 
against individuals or groups of individuals on the basis of their gender” (UN Human Rights 
Office of the High Commissioner 2014). It recognizes that “victims of such violence continue 
to be disproportionally women and girls”, but that “men and boys are also targets of gender-
based and sexual violence” (UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner 2014). 
Namely, GBV is used as “an umbrella term used to distinguish common violence from 
violence that is directed against individuals or groups of individuals on the basis of their sex, 
gender identity or socially ascribed gender roles” (UN Human Rights Office of the High 
Commissioner 2011, 29). However, it is noteworthy that this definition is supplemented by the 
assertion that “while women, men, boys and girls can all be victims of gender-based violence, 
the primary victims have been women and girls” (UN Human Rights Office of the High 
Commissioner 2011, 29). In addition, it is also recognized that “violence against lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, transgender and intersex people also often based on gender” (UN Human Rights 
Office of the High Commissioner 2011, 29). 
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The UN High Commissioner for Refugees also employs an inclusive conception of the 
term „GBV‟, which is “used to distinguish common violence from violence that targets 
individuals or groups of individuals on the basis of their gender” (UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees 2003, 10). Namely, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, GBV 
“also hinders the development of men and boys” (UN High Commissioner for Refugees 2003, 
10). However, it is recognized as well that “gender-based violence has a devastating impact 
on the lives of women and girls who are the majority of victims/survivors” (UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees 2003, 10). 
 
APPROACH OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS TO  
CASES CONCERNING GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has issued a number of important judgments 
that formulate standards in the sphere of protection from GBV, which cover almost all types 
of GBV.As it has been widely acknowledged that most gender-based violence is inflicted on 
women and girls, for the purpose of the analysis of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR in this 
sense, the term „VAW‟ will be used as a synonym of GBV. In fact, the thematic factsheet 
issued by the ECtHR as regards its case-law on GBV use the term „VAW‟ (European Court of 
Human Rights 2020). Namely, it refers to various forms of VAW addressed in the case-law of 
the Court. 
The Court has examined a number of cases concerning violence against women, 
committed both by the state and private individuals. It has addressed almost all forms of 
VAW (European Court of Human Rights 2020), such as: 
1. Domestic violence (Airey v. Ireland (1979); Osman v. the United Kingdom (1998); 
Kontrovà v. Slovakia (2007); Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria (2008); BrankoTomašić and 
Others v. Croatia (2009); Opuz v. Turkey (2009); E.S. and Others v. Slovakia (2009); 
D.M.D. v. Romania; N. v. Sweden (2010); A. v. Croatia (2010); Hajduovà v. Slovakia 
(2010); E.M. v. Romania (2012); Y.C. v. the United Kingdom (2012); Kalucza v. Hungary 
(2012); Kowal v. Poland (2012) (decision on admissibility); Irene Wilson v. the United 
Kingdom (2012) (decision on admissibility); Valiuliene v. Lithuania (2013); Eremia and 
Others v. the Republic of Moldova (2013); D.P. v. Lithuania (2013) (strike-out decision); 
Rumor v. Italy (2014); Durmaz v. Turkey (2014); Wasiewska v. Poland (2014) (decision 
on admissibility); Civek v. Turkey (2016); HalimeKilic v. Turkey (2016); M.G. v. Turkey 
(2016); Bălsan v. Romania (2017); Talpis v. Italy (2017); O.C.I. and Others v. Romania 
(2019) (Committee judgment); Kurt v. Austria (2019); Volodina v. Russia (2019)) 
2. Rape and Sexual Abuse (X and Y v. the Netherlands (1985); C.R. v. the United Kingdom 
(1995); S.W. v. the United Kingdom (1995); Aydin v. Turkey (1997); M.C. v. Bulgaria 
(2003); Maslova and Nalbandov v. Russia (2008); P.M. v. Bulgaria (2012); I.G. v. 
Republic of Moldova (2012); M. and Others v. Italy and Bulgaria (2012); P. and S. v. 
Poland (2012); O‟Keeffe v. Ireland (2014)(Grand Chamber); W. v. Slovenia (2014); M.A. 
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v. Slovenia and N.D. v. Slovenia (2015); S.Z. v. Bulgaria (2015); I.P. v. the Republic of 
Moldova (2015); Y. v. Slovenia (2015); M.G.C. v. Romania (2016); I.C. v. Romania (2016); 
B.V. v. Belgium (2017); E.B. v. Romania (2019) (Committee judgment)) 
3. Risk of ill-treatment in case of expulsion (for fear of): 
a. Female genital mutilation (Collins and Akaziebie v. Sweden (2007) (decision on 
admissibility; Izevbekhai v. Ireland (2011) (decision on admissibility); Omeredo v. 
Austria (2011) (decision on admissibility); Sow v. Belgium (2016); Bangura v. Belgium 
(2016) (strike-out decision)) 
b. Honour crime and Ill-treatment by the family (A.A. and Others v. Sweden (2012); 
R.D. v. France (2016)) 
c. Risk of trafficking or re-traffcking (L.R. v. the United Kingdom (2011) (strike-out 
decision); V.F. v. France (2011) (decision on admissibility); F.A. v. the United 
Kingdom (2013) (decision on admissibility); O.G.O. v. the United Kingdom (2014) 
(strike-out decision)) 
d. Social exclusion (N. v. Sweden (2010); W.H. v. Sweden (2015) (Grand Chamber); 
R.H. v. Sweden (2015))  
4. Police violence (Aydin v. Turkey (1997); Y.F. v. Turkey (2003); Maslova and Nalbandov 
v. Russia (2008); YazgülYilmaz v. Turkey (2011); B.S. v. Spain (2012); Izci v. Turkey 
(2013); AfetSüreyyaEren v. Turkey (2015); DilekAslan v. Turkey (2015); EbruDincer v. 
Turkey (2019)) 
5. Ill-treatment in detention (Juhnke v. Turkey (2003) 
6. Trafficking in human beings (Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia (2010); L.E. v. Greece (2016); 
J. and Others v. Austria (2017)) 
7. Violence by private individuals (Sandra Janković v. Croatia (2009); Ebcin v. Turkey 
(2011); Irina Smirnova v. Ukraine (2016)) 
 
In a number of key judgments concerning different forms of VAW, the ECtHR has 
formulated and developed various principles and standards that lay the foundation for 
securing protection from GBV. Given that most cases concerning GBV that are brought 
before the Court are related to domestic violence, and rape and sexual abuse, the main focus 
will be placed on these type of cases. 
The cases Airey v. Ireland (9 October 1979, Series A no. 39) and Osman v. the United 
Kingdom (28 October 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VIII) do not deal 
directly with violence against women. However, they are important in this regard as they lay a 
foundation for the concepts subsequently used by the Court. 
The case Airey v. Ireland (9 October 1979, Series A no. 39) involves violence against 
women since Mrs Aireysought to separate from her husband, who threatened her with 
physical violence, and occasionally subjected her to physical violence. Due to lack of financial 
resources and in the absence of legal aid provided by the State, she had been unable to 
engage a lawyer to represent her before the Court. Among the other, she alleged a violation 
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of Article 6 and Article 8. The ECtHR found that the high costs of seeking a separation order 
before the Irish courts have violated the applicant‟s right to access to court under Article 6 of 
the ECHR. The Court also found that the inability to obtain a judicial separation from her 
husband constituted a violation of the applicant right to respect for her private and family life 
under Article 8 of the ECHR. 
The importance of this judgment is in recognizing that Article 8, besides its primarily 
negative undertaking, also imposes a positive obligation inherent in an effective respect for 
private or family life. Namely, this case is one of the founders of the concept of positive 
obligations arising under the Convention for the State Parties. 
In the case Osman v. the United Kingdom (28 October 1998, Reports of Judgments 
and Decisions 1998-VIII), the Court further articulated the responsibility of the national 
authorities for private acts. In this case, the applicant's husband was killed by her son's former 
teacher, while her son was seriously wounded. Before the accident took place, the teacher 
had already threatened the applicant and her family. She complained that the national 
authorities have failed to protect the right to life of her husband from the threat posed by the 
teacher. However, the ECtHR did not find a violation of Article 2 of the Convention. 
According to the Court‟s reasoning, Article 2 implied a positive obligation on the authorities 
to take preventive measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk from the criminal acts 
of another individual. Yet, the Court concluded that the facts in the case did not show that 
the police knew or ought to have known that the lives of the Osman family were at real and 
immediate risk from the teacher.  
Accordingly, the national authorities did not breach Article 2. This case is important 
because the Court determined criteria to be followed in order to establish that the national 
authorities have violated their positive obligation to protect the right to life. According to the 
Court, “it must be established (…) that the authorities knew or ought to have known at the 
time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or 
individuals from the criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to take measures within 
the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that 
risk” (Osman v. the United Kingdom, 28 October 1998, § 115, Reports of Judgments and 
Decisions 1998-VIII). These criteria are known as the „Osman test‟. 
In its further cases, the Court continued to use the „Osman test‟ and applied it in 
domestic violence cases. Namely, in the case Kontrová v. Slovakia (no. 7510/04, 31 May 2007), 
the Court extended the positive obligations inherent in Article 2 of the Convention to the 
domestic context. It should be taken into account that the Court did not directly address the 
abuse suffered by the applicant, but the violation was found as regards the rights of the 
children. Nevertheless, the significant aspect of this case is that the findings explicitly apply to 
domestic violence and have unequivocally contributed to the development of the case-law of 
the Court (McQuigg 2011, 50). The findings of the Court in the case Kontrová v. Slovakia were 
subsequently confirmed two years later in its judgment delivered in the case Branko Tomašić 
and Others v. Croatia (no. 46598/06, 15 January 2009). 
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The concept of positive obligations was further applied and articulated in the case 
Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria (no. 71127/01, 12 June 2008).The applicant in this case was a 
victim of domestic violence. The case represents a landmark case since the Court held for the 
first time that there was a violation of the Convention concerning the actual abuse suffered 
by the applicant herself, as a victim of domestic violence. However, the case Bevacqua and S. 
v. Bulgaria was criticized because of the absence of focus on the discrimination aspect 
(Hasselbacher 2010, 208-209). 
The discrimination aspect of violence against women was addressed by the Court in 
the case Opuz v. Turkey (no. 33401/02, ECHR 2009). Namely, this case is considered a 
landmark case because for the first time in a domestic violence case the Court held that there 
had been a violation of Article 14 of the Convention (prohibition of discrimination, in 
conjunction with Article 2 and Article 3. Namely, the Court recognized that domestic violence 
affected mainly women, while the general and discriminatory judicial passivity in Turkey 
created a climate that was conducive to it. According to the Court‟s findings, the violence 
suffered by the applicant and her mother could therefore be regarded as having been 
gender-based and discriminatory against women. Despite the reforms carried out by the 
Turkish Government in recent years, the overall unresponsiveness of the judicial system and 
the impunity enjoyed by aggressors, as found in the applicant‟s case, indicated an insufficient 
commitment on the part of the authorities to take appropriate action to address domestic 
violence (Opuz v. Turkey, no. 33401/02, § 200, ECHR 2009). 
It is important to emphasize that the Court‟s judgments in the cases Bevacqua and S. 
v. Bulgaria and Opuz v. Turkey “recognize and advance the due diligence standard in the 
context of domestic violence” (Hasselbacher 2010, 203). Namely, there are several minimums 
foreseen that provide practical substance in order to assess the adherence of the state “to 
the principles of protection, investigation, and prosecution” (Hasselbacher 2010, 203).  
These minimums incorporate the availability of a judicial mechanism in order to obtain 
protection measures, as well as prosecution for all crimes of domestic violence in the public 
interest. As it was pointed out, the Court went a step further in the case Opuz v. Turkey and 
recognized that the failure of the national authorities to exercise due diligence represents a 
gender-based discrimination. 
In the case Valiuliene v. Lithuania (no. 33234/07, 26 March 2013), concerning the 
complaint by a woman who was a victim of domestic violence about the state‟s failure to 
investigate her allegations of ill-treatment and to bring her partner to account, the 
adequateness of the „Osman test‟ in situations of domestic violence was criticized by Judge 
de Albuquerque. Namely, in the Concurring opinion he emphasized that the stage of an 
„immediate risk‟ was often too late for the national authorities to intervene. Namely, “the 
recurrence and escalation inherent in most cases of domestic violence makes it somehow 
artificial, even deleterious, to require an immediacy of the risk” (Valiuliené v. Lithuania 2013). 
In that sense, “a more rigorous standard of diligence is especially necessary in the context of 
certain societies” (Valiuliené v. Lithuania 2013). He concludes that “the emerging due 
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diligence standard in domestic violence cases is stricter than the classical Osman test” 
(Valiuliené v. Lithuania 2013). 
In the case Talipis v. Italy (no. 41237/14, 2 March 2017), concerning the conjugal 
violence suffered by the applicant, which resulted in the murder of her son and her own 
attempted murder, “the Court seems to follow the way paved by Judge de Albuquerque” (De 
Vido 2017, 5). According to the Court, “the risk of a real and immediate threat (…) must be 
assessed taking due account of the particular context of domestic violence”. Furthermore, “In 
such a situation it is not only a question of an obligation to afford general protection to 
society (…) but above all to take account of the recurrence of successive episodes of violence 
within the family unit” (Talpis v. Italy, no. 41237/14, § 122, 2 March 2017). 
Similarly, in the case O’Keeffe v. Ireland (no. 35810/09, § 146, ECHR 2014), concerning 
the responsibility of the national authorities for the sexual abuse of a nine year old schoolgirl 
by a lay teacher in an Irish National School, the Court emphasized the importance of the 
context in which the human violation occurred (De Vido 2017, 5). In the Court‟s view, “having 
regard to the fundamental nature of the rights guaranteed by Article 3 and the particularly 
vulnerable nature of children, it is an inherent obligation of government to ensure their 
protection from ill-treatment, especially in a primary-education context, through the 
adoption, as necessary, of special measures and safeguards” (O’Keeffe v. Ireland [GC], no. 
35810/09, § 146, ECHR 2014).  
However, in the judgment delivered in the case Kurt v. Austria (no. 62903/15, 4 July 
2019) two years later, concerning the murder of the applicant‟s son by his father after 
previous allegations of domestic violence by the applicant against the father, the Court 
followed the classical „Osman test‟. Five days after the judgment in the case Kurt v. Austria, 
the Court issued a judgment in the case Volodina v. Russia (no. 41261/17, 9 July 2019), 
concerning the applicant‟s complaint that the national authorities had failed to protect her 
from repeated domestic violence, including assaults, kidnapping, stalking and treats. The 
applicant also alleged that the current Russian legal system is not adequate in order to deal 
with such violence and discriminatory against women. In this case, the Court applied the 
approach established in the case Talpis v. Italy regarding the obligation of the national 
authorities under Article 3 of the Convention. The issues that are raised in rape and sexual 
abuse cases are to a large extent comparable to those that are raised in domestic violence 
cases. Namely, those are the issues of the existence and scope of the states‟ positive 
obligations, the article under which the Court should examine the violation alleged in the 
complaint, as well as the necessary means in order to achieve effective protection of the 
victims.  
The first rape case raised before the ECtHR is the case X and Y v. the Netherlands (26 
March 1985, Series A no. 91). The case concerned the responsibility of the state for the rape 
of a girl with a mental handicap (the second applicant), in the home for children with mental 
disabilities where she lived, the day after her sixteenth birthday (which was the age of consent 
for sexual intercourse in the Netherlands) by a relative of the person in charge. The girl 
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deemed unfit to sign an official complaint due to her low mental age, so her father (the first 
applicant) signed in her place. However, the proceedings were initiated against the 
perpetrator as the girl had to file the complaint itself. The Court recalled that in addition to 
the primary negative undertaking of the State in the context of Article 8 of the Convention, 
there may also be positive obligations inherent in an effective respect for private or family life. 
Accordingly, the Court found that the protection afforded by civil law in respect of the 
second applicant was insufficient as fundamental values and essential aspects of private life 
were concerned in the case. Therefore, effective deterrence was necessary in this area, which 
could be achieved only by criminal law provisions. Taking in consideration the failure of the 
Dutch Criminal Code to provide her with practical and effective protection, as well as the 
nature of the wrongdoing, the Court found that the second applicant had been the victim of 
a violation of Article 8. The judgment delivered in the case X and Y v. the Netherlands is 
considered a landmark judgment as it developed the concept of positive obligations 
regarding rape cases. 
The cases C.R v. the United Kingdom (22 November 1995, Series A no. 335-C) and 
S.W. v. the United Kingdom (22 November 1995, Series A no. 335-B) put an end of the 
“marital rape exemption”. These cases are also specific because they were brought before the 
ECtHR by the men who were convicted of rape and attempted rape. 
Another important case that concerns rape is Aydin v. Turkey (25 September 1997, 
Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VI). In this case, the Court considered rape as a 
form of torture under Article 3 of the Convention for the first time. The case concerned a 
complaint by a young Turkish woman of Kurdish origin (17 years old at the relevant time), 
who was arrested without explanation and taken into custody, along with two other members 
of her family. She was blindfolded, beaten, stripped naked, sprayed with cold water from 
high-pressure jets while being spun in a tire before being raped by a member of the security 
forces, and then again beaten for about an hour by several people. A subsequent medical 
examination by a doctor, who had never before dealt with a rape case, found her hymen torn 
and widespread bruising on her thighs. The Court emphasized that rape of a detainee by a 
state official must be considered to be an especially grave and abhorrent form of ill-
treatment given the ease with which the offender can exploit the vulnerability and weakened 
resistance of his victim. Furthermore, it stressed that rape leaves deep psychological scars on 
the victim. The Court found that both the accumulation of acts of physical and mental 
violence inflicted on the applicant while in custody and the especially cruel act of rape to 
which she had been subjected had amounted to torture, in violation of Article 3 of the 
Convention. In addition, an allegation of rape by an official in custody required that the victim 
be examined with all appropriate sensitivity by independent doctors with the relevant 
expertise. That did not occur, making the investigation deficient and denying the applicant 
access to compensation, in violation of Article 13 of the Convention. 
The case M.C. v. Bulgaria (no. 39272/98, ECHR 2003-XII) confirmed that rape can also 
be considered under Article 3 in situations that only involve non-state actors. It confirmed as 
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well the content of the positive obligations of the state in terms of effective implementation 
of measures of protection, and provided the definition of rape. Namely, one of the most 
significant findings of the Court in this case is the emphasis on consent rather than force 
regarding the definition of rape. The judgment delivered in the case M.C. v. Bulgaria is 
considered a landmark judgment as the national authorities are now obliged to prosecute all 
forms of rape, regardless of the fact whether the victim has actively resisted. The Court used 
a gender-sensitive approach in this case, in order to achieve such an improvement (Radacic 
2008, 130). However, there are also some critics addressed to the case, as regards the lack of 
articulation of the issues in question as inequality issues. Namely, in the acquaintance-rape 
case of M.C. v. Bulgaria, the inadequacies of Bulgarian law in dealing with cases of rape were 
treated only as a violation of the substantive law (Londono 2009, 657-667). 
Furthermore, in cases such as M.G.C. v. Romania(no. 61495/11, 15 March 2016) and I.C. 
v. Romania (no. 36934/08, 24 May 2016), the Court established that States have a positive 
obligation to adopt and apply criminal law provisions that effectively punish rape, and that 
they must especially provide protection for children and other vulnerable persons. 
In the case E.B. v. Romania (no. 49089/2010, 19 March 2019), the Court applied the 
existing case-law as regards the criminalization of rape and sexual violence, as well as the 
context-sensitivity that is required regarding vulnerable applicants. The obligation based in 
the ECHR to criminalize may sound strange.  
Namely, these types of cases expand the State‟s coercive power, while most of the 
case-law of the Court, for example under Articles 5, 6 and 7 of the ECHR, is focused on 
constraining the State‟s coercive power and the domestic criminal law. The obligation for the 
State to criminalize constitutes a part of States‟ so-called “coercive obligations” (Heri 2009). 
 
 
ISTANBUL CONVENTION AS A MEANS FOR INTERPRETATION OF  
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
The Istanbul Convention is “the most far reaching international treaty to tackle 
violence against women” (Organization of American States and Council of Europe 2014, 89). 
It is particularly important due to the fact that “it breaks new ground by requesting states to 
criminalize the various forms of violence against women, including physical, sexual and 
psychological violence, stalking, sexual harassment, female genital mutilation, forced 
marriage, forced abortion and forced sterilization” (Organization of American States and 
Council of Europe 2014, 89). 
The principles and standards developed in the case-law of the ECtHR as regards cases 
of VAW are now incorporated in the Istanbul Convention and thus became legally binding 
(Duban and Radacic 2017, 40). In that sense, the Istanbul Convention incorporates the „due 
diligence‟ standard and defines it as the States‟ obligation to “prevent, investigate, punish and 
provide reparation for acts of violence perpetrated by non-state actors” (Council of Europe 
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2011, Article 5). The argumentative moves of the ECtHR in certain cases concerning VAW 
seems to show that the provisions of the Istanbul Convention “can constitute „relevant rules 
of international law‟ under Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the 
Treaties (…) in the interpretation of applicable articles of the European Convention on Human 
Rights” (De Vido 2017, 1). 
For example, the judgment delivered by the Court in the case Talpis v. Italy 
demonstrates that the provisions of the Istanbul Convention are used as relevant rules of 
international law in the interpretation of the ECHR, in order to identify the obligations of the 
national authorities in preventing domestic violence (Talpis v. Italy, no. 41237/14, § 58, 2 
March 2017). 
In this sense, when looking into the alleged violation of Article 3, the Court stresses 
that “special diligence is required in dealing with domestic violence cases” and recognizes 
that “the specific nature of domestic violence as recognized in the Preamble to the Istanbul 
Convention (…) must be taken into account in the context of domestic proceedings” (Talpis v. 
Italy, no. 41237/14, § 129, 2 March 2017). Furthermore, the Court emphasized that “the 
Istanbul Convention imposes a duty on the States Parties to take „the necessary legislative or 
other measures to ensure that investigations and judicial proceedings in relation to all forms 
of violence covered by the scope of this Convention are carried out without undue delay 
while taking into consideration the rights of the victim during all stages of the criminal 
proceedings” (Talpis v. Italy, no. 41237/14, § 129, 2 March 2017). 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Given that it has been widely acknowledged that most GBV is inflicted on women and 
girls, by men, the term gender-based violence and the term violence against women are often 
used interchangeably, including in some international conventions. As there is an increasing 
tendency to use GBV as a broader term compared to VAW, it seems that the two terms are 
not synonymous. However, it should not be forgotten that using the “gender based” aspect is 
very important as it emphasizes the fact that most forms of violence against women have its 
roots in the inequality of power between women and men. 
The ECtHR has built up a substantial body of jurisprudence regarding almost all forms 
of GBV. Namely, despite the lack of specific provisions in the ECHR concerning GBV, the 
Court has developed an extensive case-law in this filed, by using a number of provisions in 
the Convention as relevant to GBV. In this sense, the Court repeatedly applied the Articles 2, 
3, 4, 6, 8, 13 and 14 in the examination of GBV cases. The Court dealt mostly with cases 
related to domestic violence, and rape and sexual abuse, but it also addressed other forms of 
GBV, such as ill-treatment in detention, police violence, female genital mutilation, honor 
crime, forced marriage, risk of trafficking and re-trafficking, social exclusion, trafficking in 
human beings, etc. 
There have been very positive developments within the case-law of the Court 
concerning different forms of GBV, such as entailing both negative and positive obligations 
for the State in the context of Articles 2, 3, 4 and 8; requiring from States to also act in 
situations occurring solely in the private sphere; determining that GBV amounts to 
discrimination; establishing the principle that in certain circumstances domestic violence and 
rape may fall under Article 3, etc. 
It seems that, in general, the approach of the Court followed a similar path when 
examining the different forms of GBV. However, there are a few cases, such as the case Kurt 
v. Austria (no. 62903/15, 4 July 2019), where it seems that the Court departed from its 
previously established case-law and did not take into account certain standards regarding 
domestic violence. Namely, this approach carries a potential to undermine the progress 
made within the case-law of the Court concerning domestic violence cases and create 
uncertainty as regards the standards that should be followed in such cases. At the same time, 
it is also noteworthy that at the moment of writing this paper, the judgment delivered in this 
case is still not final in terms of Article 44(2) of the Convention. Namely, it remains to be seen 
whether the Court will clarify this issue in its future case-law. 
It is evident from the analysis conducted in respect of the case-law of the ECtHR that 
the spate of cases on GBV considered by the Court is remarkable, and provides solid 
protection from different forms of GBV. However, as it seems that certain aspects of the case-
law of the Court on GBV are somewhat inconsistent, it is very important for the Court to fully 
clarify its approach in this sense, particularly given that its judgments are the main guidelines 
for the States in fulfilling properly their obligations arising from the Convention. 
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Another significant development as regards the protection from GBV before the 
ECtHR is the entry into force of the Istanbul Convention. Namely, as seen from the analyses 
conducted, it seems that the provisions of the Istanbul Convention, as relevant rules of 
international law, are useful in order to expand the scope of application of the Convention 
provisions that are relevant in cases concerning GBV. 
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